I. The Data Trail Behind a Paper
In a research institute engaged in new materials research, behind a paper about to be published lies a data trail spanning multiple endpoints.
Laboratory personnel collected thousands of sets of material performance data on the laboratory’s instrument control endpoints, and transmitted the raw data back to the research group’s workstation through the internal network. The researcher completed data analysis and chart plotting on the workstation, and sent the draft to a professor at a partner university via email. The professor returned revision comments after annotating, and the researcher revised the paper based on the comments, finally submitting it through the journal submission system. Throughout the entire process, data flowed repeatedly among laboratory endpoints, research workstations, personal laptops, and partner institution endpoints.
This trail appears smooth, but when the security team examined it, they discovered numerous hidden risks: instrument endpoints were running old operating systems with patches stuck years in the past; research workstations had data analysis scripts of unknown origin installed; the researcher’s personal laptop simultaneously stored classified project data and public paper drafts; data exchanges with external partner universities were completed through personal email; and submission system account credentials were recorded in the browser.
These hidden risks are not the result of weak security awareness among researchers, but the inevitable outcome of the inherent characteristics of research work. The essence of research is openness and collaboration, while the essence of security is control and boundaries. When the two meet on endpoints, conflict becomes unavoidable.
II. The Fourfold Particularity of Research Institutes
Endpoint security management in research institutes faces unique challenges distinct from industries such as enterprise, government, and finance.
The first particularity: Extremely heterogeneous endpoint types. The endpoint environment of a research institute includes: researcher workstations (running MATLAB, Python, and professional simulation software), laboratory instrument control endpoints (connected to precision equipment such as spectrometers, electron microscopes, and material testing machines), administrative office endpoints, personal devices of students and visiting scholars, and potentially computing clusters and GPU servers. These endpoints differ in operating system versions, hardware configurations, network environments, and usage scenarios. Covering all endpoints with a single set of policies is neither realistic nor reasonable.
The second particularity: Highly differentiated data sensitivity levels. The data assets of a research institute cover: military projects involving state secrets, enterprise collaboration projects involving trade secrets, patent application materials involving intellectual property, and academic paper data that can be publicly published. The sensitivity levels of this data span multiple tiers from “top secret” to “public,” yet they often coexist in the same research group, on the same endpoint, and in the same laboratory. How to protect sensitive data while keeping public data flowing is a delicate balancing problem.
The third particularity: Extremely high personnel mobility. The personnel composition of a research institute includes formal researchers, postdoctoral fellows, doctoral students, master’s students, visiting scholars, enterprise joint-training personnel, and externally hired experts. Students graduating, postdoctoral fellows completing their terms, and visiting scholars ending their visits—these personnel mobility nodes are often accompanied by a series of management actions such as data handover, equipment return, and account cancellation. But in reality, many research institutes rely on manual reminders for managing these nodes and lack systematic process guarantees.
The fourth particularity: Highly open academic collaboration. Research work cannot be separated from academic exchange. Collaborative research with domestic and international universities, joint efforts with enterprises, participation in academic conferences, and submission to journals—these activities all require data exchange. If security controls are too strict, academic collaboration will be impossible; if controls are insufficient, core data may leak through academic exchange channels.
III. Ping64: Classified and Graded Endpoint Governance
Ping64’s integrated office security platform does not cover all endpoints with a single set of policies, but establishes an endpoint governance system of “classified management, graded control, and differentiated auditing” on a unified platform.
- Classified management means dividing endpoints into different categories such as research workstations, instrument endpoints, office endpoints, and personal devices based on endpoint type and purpose, with each category using a different security policy template.
- Graded control means dividing files into different levels such as core, important, general, and public based on data sensitivity levels, with different levels of data receiving different intensities of control at stages such as creation, storage, circulation, and outbound transfer.
- Differentiated auditing means dividing audit permissions into different tiers based on personnel roles and responsibilities. Research group leaders can view their group’s data flow records, the institute’s security team can view the institute-wide audit view, and higher-level supervisory authorities can retrieve compliance reports.
The concrete implementation of this governance system in research institute scenarios is reflected in the collaboration of capabilities at four levels.
IV. Research Work: Safeguarding Data Security
Research workstations are the core productivity tools of research institutes. These endpoints run computation-intensive applications such as MATLAB, Python, R language, and professional simulation software, consuming enormous system resources. If the security solution causes computation task lag or file corruption, researchers will not tolerate it.
Ping64’s design logic in research workstation scenarios is “transparent protection, imperceptible operation.”
On the endpoint side, transparent document encryption sinks encryption and decryption logic down to the operating system kernel layer. When authorized processes read or write specified file types, encryption and decryption are completed automatically, while unauthorized processes always receive ciphertext. Ping64 supports deep compatibility with mainstream research computing software and will not cause MATLAB computation lag, Python script execution failure, or simulation software crashes due to encryption.
At the level of data protection, Ping64’s content identification engine comes with preset data identification rules common in the research industry, capable of identifying sensitive information such as experimental data, patent materials, and project application documents. When a file is created or saved in a controlled application, the system automatically determines its sensitivity level and triggers corresponding protection actions. For core data involving military projects, Ping64 supports mandatory encryption and strict outbound control; for general academic paper drafts, Ping64 maintains normal circulation efficiency.
For outbound behavior on research workstations, Ping64 deeply links the approval process with content identification, endpoint status, and recipient identity. When a researcher needs to send a paper draft to a partner university, the system automatically identifies whether the file contains classified data and triggers the corresponding approval process based on preset policies. After approval, the file automatically has tracing watermarks added, validity periods set, and tracing identifiers embedded.
V. Instrument Endpoints: Differentiated Control with Stability as Priority
Laboratory instrument control endpoints are the most special type of endpoint in research institutes. These endpoints are connected to precision equipment such as spectrometers, electron microscopes, nuclear magnetic resonance instruments, and material testing machines, and run dedicated control software provided by equipment vendors. The management logic of these endpoints is completely opposite to that of research workstations: research workstations emphasize updating at any time, while instrument endpoints emphasize not moving anything carelessly.
If an instrument endpoint’s control software cannot run due to security policies, an ongoing experiment may be directly scrapped; if system updates cause equipment driver incompatibility, it may take days to recover. Therefore, the security management of instrument endpoints must take “not affecting equipment operation” as the primary principle.
Ping64’s design logic in instrument endpoint scenarios is “minimal intervention, precise control.”
- Peripheral port control: Only registered USB devices are recognized, and private drives have no response when inserted; plug-in records and file operation records are retained together, making it possible to trace which drive, when, and what was copied. Bluetooth, wireless network cards, optical drives, and serial ports are brought under unified control.
- System privilege control: Registry, Group Policy, Device Manager, Task Manager, Control Panel, and Safe Mode are disabled according to policies; IP addresses and computer names are not allowed to be modified arbitrarily; installing new software is prohibited, and only software within the enterprise software library or whitelisted installation packages are allowed.
- Patch management executed according to experiment rhythm: Ping64 supports unified patch statistics and distribution, with timing selected during experiment gaps or equipment idle periods. Restarting the entire institute at the same time is unrealistic for research institutes.
- Network communication whitelist control: Instrument endpoints are only allowed to communicate with specified data servers and LIMS systems, and all other network requests are intercepted. Privately connecting mobile hotspots and connecting to external WiFi are identified. After triggering an alert, network disconnection and screen locking can be linked.
VI. Individuals and External Parties: Establishing Boundaries Within Openness
It is normal for researchers to use personal devices to access intranet resources and exchange data with external partner institutions. Ping64’s design logic in open collaboration scenarios is “dual verification of identity and device, data does not land, and full-process auditing.”
For scenarios where personal devices are used to access intranet resources, Ping64 performs strict compliance verification before access: whether operating system patches meet standards, whether antivirus software is running, whether high-risk software exists, and whether the Ping64 client is running normally. Only when compliance items meet standards is the endpoint allowed to connect. After connection, Ping64 dynamically grants least privilege based on user identity and role, and employees can only access authorized resources, not the entire intranet.
For data exchanges with external partner institutions, Ping64 supports controlled outbound formats: files are transmitted in encrypted form, and the recipient needs to open them in a specified environment. Upon opening, it automatically connects to the verification server for identity verification and permission checks. Files cannot be forwarded, copied, or saved as other formats, ensuring the secure flow of core data in academic collaboration.
For classified data involving military projects or enterprise collaboration projects, Ping64 supports stricter control policies: prohibiting screenshots, prohibiting printing, prohibiting copying to the clipboard, and prohibiting outbound transfer through any channel. This data can only be used in specified controlled environments, and any operation is fully recorded.
VII. Personnel Mobility Scenarios:
Research institutes have extremely high personnel mobility. Students graduating, postdoctoral fellows completing their terms, and visiting scholars ending their visits—these nodes are often high-risk windows for data leaks. Ping64’s personnel mobility management capability upgrades departure handover from “manual reminders” to “systematic processes.”
- Pre-departure alerts: The system automatically generates departure alerts based on personnel type (such as student graduation time and visiting scholar visit duration), reminding research group leaders to initiate the data handover process.
- Data handover auditing: During the handover period, the system records all operations by that person on files—downloading, copying, outbound transfer, printing, etc. After handover is completed, the system generates a complete handover report listing all sensitive files the person has accessed and their flow records.
- Automatic permission revocation: After personnel depart, the system automatically revokes their account permissions, cancels their device access qualifications, and freezes their file access permissions. All operation records are retained for auditing.
- Equipment return verification: For returned research equipment, the system checks whether sensitive data remains on the device, ensuring data is compliantly cleaned.
VIII. Governance Value of the Integrated Platform
Integrating the security management of research workstations, instrument endpoints, office endpoints, and personal devices on the same platform provides governance value in research institute scenarios at three levels.
1. Coexistence of differentiated and unified policies. The security policies for the four types of endpoints are different—research workstations focus on data encryption and computational compatibility, instrument endpoints focus on system stability and peripheral control, office endpoints focus on software compliance and document protection, and personal devices focus on access verification and data not landing. But these policies are centrally configured in the Ping64 unified policy center, and the institute can flexibly combine policies according to endpoint type, research group, and personnel role, with one configuration taking effect across the entire institute.
2. Natural data correlation. In a multi-system architecture, operation logs of research workstations, operation records of instrument endpoints, and outbound approval processes are stored in different systems, and post-event tracing requires manual reconstruction. Ping64’s security modules run on the same data foundation. Endpoint operation logs, file flow records, and outbound approval records share the same file identifier and user identifier at the moment they are generated, and correlation is natural, real-time, and accurate.
3. Differentiated auditing and compliance. Ping64 supports tiered management of audit permissions. Research group leaders can view their group’s data flow records for daily management; the institute’s security team can view the institute-wide audit view for security operations; and higher-level supervisory authorities can retrieve compliance reports for supervision and inspection. This differentiated auditing mechanism both safeguards the autonomy of research work and meets the requirements of compliance management.
Conclusion: Making Openness and Security No Longer Opposed
The essence of research is exploring the unknown, and the essence of security is guarding the known. Under traditional security management models, the two are often in opposition—the stricter the security control, the harder academic collaboration becomes; the more open the academic collaboration, the higher the security risk.
What the Ping64 integrated office security platform provides for research institutes is precisely a governance logic that makes openness and security no longer opposed: classified management to achieve precise identification of endpoint assets, graded control to achieve refined protection of data assets, and differentiated auditing to achieve reasonable allocation of management responsibilities. When research workstations can be transparently encrypted without affecting computational efficiency, when instrument endpoints can operate stably without interference from security policies, and when academic collaboration can flow securely within a controlled framework, researchers no longer need to choose between “efficiency” and “security.”
In an era where research data is increasingly becoming a national strategic resource and academic collaboration is increasingly globalized, endpoint security management is no longer a problem that can be remedied after the fact. Making every endpoint—whether a research workstation, an instrument control endpoint, or a personal device—operate under a unified security framework may be the most pragmatic safeguard for the research cause.
Contact
15 min 
